At the end of 1991, the future of the political, economic, and energy relations between the former republics of the Soviet Union was unclear. No matter how economic and political reactions between republics evolve, however, environmental problems will remain a link between the republics, and with the West as well. Winds transporting acid rain do not recognize borders.
Through the use of wind patterns and data from monitoring stations located along the western borders of the European USSR, this paper examines recent trends in the emissions of sulfur dioxide from the Soviet Union as a whole, and analyzes emissions by republic in order to gain a general understanding of the environmental links of transboundary pollution among republics, as well with Europe.
Acid deposition in Western Europe is dominated by sulfur dioxide.[1] While little is known about the acid rain that falls in the interior of the USSR, the dominance of SO[sub 2] in country-wide emissions statistics, the lack of sulfur-abatement equipment, and the low level of vehicular traffic make it extremely likely that SO[sub 2] similarly dominates the acidification of precipitation in many regions of the Soviet Union.
Conferences held by the United National as early as 1972 promoted international cooperation to control sulfur emissions (Munn 1986). In 1977, the "Co-operative program for monitoring and evaluation of the long range transmission of air pollutants in Europe" (EMEP), formed under the ECE, coordinated analysis of sulfur deposition in Europe. The EMEP model is similar to a previous OECD model for Long Range Transport of Air Pollutants (LRTAP). Unlike LRTAP, the EMEP system includes the European part of the Soviet Union (up to the Urals). The Soviet Union is also a signatory to the 1979 United Nations ECE Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (brought into force in 1983). This convention called for a 30% reduction in sulfur emissions or transboundary sulfur fluxes in Europe between 1980 and 1993.
To meet this goal, decisions were made to place great reliance on natural gas. For example, the full balance of power plants shifted. In addition, aided by a country-wide program for substituting natural gas for residual fuel oil in order to free up oil for export, natural gas not only displaced oil, but also coal and peat in regions in the Soviet Union that were experiencing production or supply problems (Cooper 1986, 1990). While the initial increase in gas utilization came from power plants located nearest to the production region of Western Siberia (in the Urals and Volga regions, for example), or along the newly-constructed export line (the Ukraine), over the past two years, power plants as far west as Moldavia, Belorussia, and Latvia have switched to natural gas. This no doubt accounts for the reduction in sulfur oxides emissions in European USSR. If the recent drop in emissions of sulfur oxides came largely from changes in the fuel balance, rather than the implementation of new emission control technology, it represents only temporary solution to the larger problem.
Since fuel allotments for industrial enterprises have been determined by central agencies, factory and power plant managers have had little say about what fuel they used. The demand for heat and electricity fluctuates dramatically between seasons, and given insufficient natural gas storage, excess demand for natural gas exists during the winter. Large gas-consuming facilities are frequently switched over to back-up fuels (residual fuel oil or coal) for several months each winter in order to provide sufficient supplies. Exacerbating winter air quality, obsolete boilers start up to meet heating demand. one Soviet energy economist has calculated that sulfur scrubbers are economical only when a natural gas/residual fuel oil power plant runs on residual fuel oil for more than 3,000 hours a year (Styrikovich and Vnukov 1989, p. 39). Assuming a load factor of 0.7, then the power plant would have to run almost 50 percent of operating time on residual fuel oil; with the recent glut of natural gas in the Soviet Union, this has certainly not been the case.
SO[sub 2] emissions from fuel combustion, which accounts for approximately 80% of emissions from stationary sources in the USSR, can be abated by reducing the sulfur intensity of fuels, or by installing abatement equipment to remove sulfur emissions from flue gases after combustion.[2] Emission patterns in the former USSR have been and continue to be influenced by availability of low-sulfur fuels and gas abatement equipment.
Relatively kale emission control equipment is available for removing sulfur emissions in the Soviet economy. Existing abatement equipment is outdated (the average age of all emission control equipment exceeds 10 years), used largely for particulate removal, and frequently fails to operate at design levels, if operating at all.[3] The largest emitter of sulfur dioxide emissions, Minenergo, installed two-thirds of its control equipment more than a decade ago; 60% of the equipment in the ferrous metallurgy industry is of the same vintage [Vestnik Statistiki 1989,pp. 77-78]. In fossil-fired power plants, only 3 sulfur-abatement unites heave been installed in the USSR. These are experimental units, and thus service only a portion of total capacity.
Costly emission control equipment, uncertain fuel deliveries in some regions, and low levels of both monitoring and punishing polluters account for the lack of incentive to install emission control equipment in the Soviet Union. Fines have been too small to be effective.
Government investment in emission control equipment grew substantially in recent years, although not without complaints that most of this money went to large, unfinished construction projects and thus had little direct or immediate impact.[4] The changing fuel balance provides a more likely explanation of a decline in sulfur emissions than pollution abatement. Natural gas consumption rose in the Soviet Union during the 1980s as a result of the Urengoi natural gas fields in Western Siberia. Natural gas now accounts for the largest share of primary energy consumption in the Soviet Union. Natural gas use has grown 80% since 1980 (accounting for almost the entire increase in energy consumption during this period), and in accounting for some 40% of the Soviet fuel energy balance in 1989 (PlanEcon 1990, p. 156).
In short, high-sulfur fuels have been displaced by natural gas, which contains insignificant amounts of sulfur. The changing sulfur content of fuel production itself has also influenced emission patterns. The sulfur intensity of both coal and oil varies substantially across the Soviet Union. Because there is insufficient sulfur-removal equipment in the Soviet refinery system, the sulfur content of residual fuel oil is quite high. only 9% of residual oil production (mazut) has a sulfur content less than 1%.[5]
There are no figures available regarding the average sulfur content of residual fuel oil, although it appears as if power plants (the single largest consumer of residual fuel oil in the Soviet Union) receive residual fuel oil with a sulfur content of 2.5-3%.[6] Therefore, recent programs to displace residual fuel oil by natural gas not only resulted in additional oil for export (in the form of residual fuel oil) but also made an important contribution to reducing sulfur emissions. For example, as oil production shifted from the Volga-Urals fields to West Siberia, the average sulfur intensity of Soviet oil production fell, because oil in the Volga-Urals production region has a relatively high sulfur content (2%), while oil from the West Siberian fields have only 0.5% sulfur; in Azerbaijan, oil has sulfur content of 0.3%. While production from the Volga-Urals fields once accounted for 80% of oil production in the RSFSR, in recent years its share has dropped to 20%, surpassed by production at the low-sulfur oil fields of West Siberia.
In addition, coal production has shifted away from the traditional basins further east, to the high quality Kuznets field, and the lower-quality coal fields of Ekibastuz (in Kazakhstan) and Kansk-Achinsk (Siberia). The coal extracted from these eastern basins are, on average, of a lower sulfur content than previously-mined coals. Since 1975, coal production from the high-sulfur coal basins of Donets and Moscow dropped 10% and 50%, respectively, while production of lower-sulfur coal has increased at Kuznets and Karaganda by 15%, in Kansk-Achinsk by 80%, and in Ekibastuz by 100% (Sayers 1989, p. 329).
Finally, Russian natural gas has recently played a key role in gasifying industrial consumers in the Baltics, Moldavia, and Belorussia. Gas supplies from Central Asia (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) have been increasing; gas from this region is used locally, as well as feeding into the centralized gas distribution system in the Russian Republic.
Data about the energy links between republics is incomplete, although it is possible;to make some general remarks about the energy dependence among republics.
Without Russian natural gas and oil, there are few energy alternatives for Moldavia, Belorussia, Latvia, Armenia, and Georgia. Estonia has reserves of shale, but there would be serious environmental problems in expanding production and consumption of this fuel. The nuclear power plant in Lithuania (Ignalina) does provide this region with energy without producing sulfur emissions, but there are other environmental concerns surrounding this facility which has 2 RBMK reactors, and there is local pressure to close it. The Ukraine has some gas production, but it is likely that domestic production only provides less than a third of recent gas consumption. The domestic energy options available to the Ukraine are nuclear power and coal. As in Lithuania, nuclear power plants in the Ukraine have come under fire recently. Ukrainian coal production both in the Donets basin and the L'vov-Volynsk basin in the west is, in general, of high sulfur content. Coal from the Donets basin has become increasingly expensive to mine--coal seams are narrow and deep--so it is not likely that there will be an increase in production from this region. However, if exports of Donets coal to other republics fall, then there can be an increase in high-sulfur coal consumption in the Ukraine without increasing production.
In the Transcaucas region (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia), Azerbaijan is the only republic with sufficient oil and gas production to possibly meet domestic demand, and it is highly unlikely that energy ties between Azerbaijan and Armenia (with almost no fuel production) will be forged in the future.
The Central Asia region does have natural gas (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) that could meet local demand, as well as some coal production. Kazakhstan has siginificant reserves of low-sulfur coal in the Karaganda and Ekibastuz basins, although owing to high ash content, coal from Ekibastuz presents a number of problems with utilization.
Sulfur dioxide emissions are dominated by the RSFSR, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, which together account for 85% of total emissions of sulfur dioxide from stationary sources. The RSFSR had the highest level of total sulfur emissions, accounting for almost 60% of country-wide emissions in 1989.
Examining total sulfur emission density (sulfur emissions per square kilometer) by republic illustrates the geographic relationship between republics and transboundary pollutants. The use of sulfur density comparisons yields more information about the sulfur-intensity of ambient air than do figures for total weight of emissions.
Across the Soviet Union, the average density of sulfur emissions was 750 kilograms per square kilometer in 1989. Moldavia had the highest density of sulfur dioxide emissions, with 7,100 kilograms SO[sub 2] per square kilometer, followed by the Ukraine at 5,100 kilograms per square kilometer, and Estonia, with 4,300 kilograms per square kilometer. Unfortunately, in some cases the republic boundaries do not provide meaningful information on regional sulfur emissions density because the geographic area is so large. For example, an average sulfur density for the RSFSR, which encompasses 17 million square kilometers (75% of the area that has been the USSR) will not provide meaningful information on emissions within the various regions of this republic. One data source does provide information on emissions by economic region which yields some interesting insights for 1988.[7] Here one can get a better idea of the sulfur emissions density of some of the more industrialized regions of both the RSFSR and Ukraine. For example, the Donets-Dnieper region of the Ukraine accounted for 2.2 metric tons of SO[sup2] emissions in 1988, or about 70% of this republic's emissions, which resulted in a sulfur emissions density of 9,940 kg/km[sup2], or almost twice the average across the republic. The heavily-industrialized Urals region of the RSFSR has been responsible for approximately 25 % of RSFSR emissions of sulfur dioxide (2.34 million tons), yielding a sulfur emissions density almost 5 times the republic average. Copper smelters in the Eastern Siberia economic region have been a major reason why this area accounted for almost 30% of RSFSR emissions of SO[sup2] (2.76 million tons).
How do these regional sulfur emission density figures compare with other countries? In the United States, the acid rain battle has been focused primarily in Ohio (2.4 metric tons SO[sup2], or 20,930 kg/km[sup2]), Indiana (1.67 metric tons SO[sup2], or 17,704 kg/km[sup2]), and Illinois (1.27 metric tons SO[sup2], or 8,467 kg/km[sup2]).[8] In terms of the absolute quantity of emissions released, the Urals region and the Donets-Dnieper region can be compared to these states. Although the sulfur emissions density in the regions of the Soviet Union that have been examined in this paper are lower than those found in the high-sulfur states of the U.S., and lower than previous emission densities in various countries of Eastern Europe (for example, in 1985, the sulfur emissions density, in terms of SO[sup2], for the GDR was 46,000 kg/km[sup2], Czechoslovakia 24,600 kg/km[sup2], Hungary 15,000 kg/km[sup2], and Poland 13,800 kg/km[sup2]),[9] the volumes of emissions are clearly of sufficient magnitude to represent a serious addition of acid rain precursors to the atmosphere.
The construction of taller smokestacks was the initial response (around the world) to improving the air quality of regions with heavily-polluting industries. This has also been the case with the Soviet Union. Because sulfur emissions released higher in the atmosphere have a much greater chance of being picked up by wind and remaining in the atmosphere a sufficient time for transformation to sulfuric acid, the use of tall smokestacks provided only a tradeoff between improving local air quality and the formation of acid rain in regions downwind from the smokestack.
Transboundary emissions are evaluated based on the international implications of sulfur emissions from the area that has been called the European USSR, and the inter-republic implications of sulfur emissions. Much more data is available to analyze the sulfur balance along the western border of the USSR than the inter-republic balances. For the later, general findings can be obtained by examining wind patterns and sulfur emission densities.
Western and Central Europe
As part of the monitoring procedures for the UN Transboundary Agreement, the Soviet Union established ten monitoring stations along its western border. Two monitoring stations are located in the RSFSR, in the Murmansk and Leningrad oblast', two in Estonia, one in Latvia, one in Lithuania, one in Belorussia, and three in the Ukraine.
Owing to wind patterns eastward from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the former GDR, the Soviet Union has been a net importer of sulfur emissions.[10] According to the results of the EMEP model of the sulfur budget for Europe, the European region of the USSR typically received more sulfur deposition than it exported to the west and north. That is, the European region of the USSR accounted for the production of 2.56 metric tons of wet and dry sulfur deposition (S) in 1986: 2.18 metric tons of S was deposited back in the European region of the USSR, and.38 metric tons deposited in other countries. The USSR supplied 25 % of sulfur deposition in Finland (the largest outside source of sulfur, contributing almost as much as internal sources). In fact, the head of the air pollution division in the Finnish Ministry of the Environment noted that two big nickel smelters located in the Kola Peninsula produced more sulfur dioxide emissions than all the sources in Finland (Whitney 1989). other countries that receive significant amounts of sulfur deposition from the USSR have been Romania, where the USSR has accounted for 12% of sulfur deposition, Turkey (10%), and Norway (5%).
Maps of wind patterns support these findings. During the winter, emissions from Moldavia and the sourth-western region of the Ukraine are blown towards Romania (and possibly Turkey). Turkey is also the recipient of emissions originating in the Caucasus. Winter wind patterns also indicate the northly flow of air from the north-west regions of the RSFSR (including the Baltic republics) towards Finland and Norway. The Chernobyl' nuclear accident, which occurred in April 1986, provides additional information on transboundary pollutants from the Soviet Union in the case of a radiation plume that originated in western Ukraine. Here, although some of the radiation blew westward towards Europe, the bulk of emissions traveled northwards across Belorussia.
Sources outside the Soviet Union were responsible for 1.16 metric tons of sulfur deposition (S) in the European region of the USSR. The largest identified outside contributor to sulfur deposition in the European USSR was Poland (22% of imported sulfur deposition), followed by the GDR (11% of imports), Bulgaria (9 % of imports), and Hungary (5 % of imports). once again, wind patterns bear out the findings of the EMEP model: westerly winds move over Eastern Europe before entering the Soviet Union. It would appear as if the northern regions of Eastern Europe (the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) are primarily responsible for sulfur deposition in the European region of the USSR during the summer and winter months, while emissions from Bulgaria and Hungary contribute to sulfur emissions transferred to the USSR during the winter months.
Republics of the Former USSR
The first reports of acid rain in the Soviet Union came in 1984, when acid deposition occurred in the Western regions (Shabad 1984). By tracing back the movements of clouds that carried the most acidic types of rains over a 48-hour period, it was determined that the acid-rain precursors were coming into the Soviet Union across the western boundary. According to this report, the Soviet territory in the western region affected by acid rain is 350,000 square miles. A later publication from the top officials of meteorology in the Soviet Union noted that, "it can be said, with confidence, that acidified rain is typical in all western parts of the European USSR."[11] There is virtually no analytical information published about the links between emissions from the Soviet Union and regional acid rain problems. Instead, the emphasis on the damage done by imported pollution is carried out in a number of later reports. [12] A recently-published ecological map of the Soviet Union, however, does indicate acid rain in a number of regions of the Soviet Union. [13] According to this map, virtually the entire northern region of the Ukraine, the southern part of Belorussia, the western region of Latvia, an extensive area south of Moscow (as well as a small region to the west), regions to the west, north, and east of the Urals (in particular, the southern reaches of Western Siberia) and virtually the entire northern region bordering the Arctic ocean, experience acidified rain.
A general understanding of the inter-republic emission ties are founded by analyzing the wind patterns. During the winter, it appears as if emissions from Moldavia (with the highest density of SO[sub2] per kilometer among Soviet republics) move southwest, although it is possible that some emissions are carried northwest to the Urkaine as well. Emissions from the Ukraine move northward towards Belorussia and the RSFSR. As noted above, air moves across the Baltics north towards Finland and Norway. In the Urals region, winds come from the southwest, carrying pollutants to western Siberia, and possibly as far north as the Arctic. In the heavily polluted regions of northern Siberia, winds move emissions northward to the Arctic, contributing to the phenomena of Arctic haze (Rahn 1984). In the summer, emissions from the Ukraine move eastward to Volga region and the North Caucasus (RSFSR). Winds off the Baltic Sea would tend to push emissions from the Baltic Republics to north-west RSFSR. Winds from northern Siberia could move emissions from the industrialized regions of western Siberia to Central Asia (including Kazakhstan). Indeed Kazakhstan could receive emissions that originated in the Urals regions as well.
Changes in the fuel balance towards increased utilization of natural gas has been a major reason why Soviet statistics show a drop in sulfur dioxide emissions. There appears to be very little equipment in place to abate emissions of SO[sub2]. A complete breakdown of inter-republic energy ties would clearly affect emission levels, as regions unable or unwilling to pay for gas deliveries from the RSFSR, or electricity from the neighboring grid system will be forced to use local low-quality fuel to generate needed energy.
There are clear environmental links between the republics of the Soviet Union. If acid rain falling in the RSFSR can be tied to emissions from the Ukraine, Moldavia, and Belorussia, the Russian Republic would have a vested interest in maintaining gas deliveries. As emissions from Eastern Europe are cleaned up, through the installation of abatement equipment or the closing of old factories, the role of sulfur emissions generated from within the western regions of the area that has been called the Soviet Union will become clearer. While Kazakhstan is a fairly large producer of sulfur emissions, there might be tension with emitters to the north in the industrial region surrounding the Kuzbas coal fields in Siberia (RSFSR). Emissions from the Baltic Republics and northwest RSFSR are clearly impacting the environment in Scandinavian countries, especially Finland.
The new economic realities offer some promises and some problems for .emissions in the future. Energy production and consumption patterns are likely to change in the future as economic reform shuts down uneconomic capacity, both in fuel protection and fuel consumption. It is unclear how independent republics will be able to finance energy production, or the importance of Russian expertise in extractive industries, such as in the gas fields of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
Proven and relatively simple technologies are available to abate sulfur dioxide emissions. However, making and using this equipment will be a problem in the short term. Not only are abatement units very costly (requiring approximately 30% of capital costs in electric power plant construction), but it is also very electricity-intensive. Reserve capacity for electricity generation is almost non-existent during peak demand periods, and during these times, power plants must shed customers. At present, many areas are facing electricity shortages. It is unlikely that, given a choice between running scrubbers and supplying an industrial facility, the electric power plant manager would choose to utilize scrubbers and cut off the consumer.
Price reforms should result in reduced energy demand, as inefficient processes are modernized or shut down. However, it is unclear how future energy prices will be determined for both domestic usage and exports to other republics: the added costs of energy-intensive production and direct energy use must be passed to consumers. Electricity prices have long been subsidized by the Soviet government. While fuel costs increased in 1991, the rise in electricity prices to industrial consumers (prices to residential consumers remained constant, and prices to rural households actually dropped to 1 kopek per kilowatt-hour) did not keep pace with the real costs of generation. At this time, it is impossible for power plants to finance scrubbers from their revenues, and centralized investment is in doubt. Even Yeltsin's recent economic program failed to address this issue, as he stated that electricity prices would continue to receive subsidies. In the past Soviet energy policy has demonstrated the inefficiencies of "planning" energy conservation. It does not work. [14]
Increased regional autonomy should have a positive effect on environmental legislation, if the regulatory bodies are given real power. The republics need to determine their own emission stards, both for point pollution and ambient air quality, but it is extremely important that the new regulations can be met by polluters. For example, the Soviet Union has had very strict standards for ambient air quality, much tougher than in other industrialized countries. While this was clearly a source of pride in the Soviet environmental literature, it did not mean that these standards were met. A realistic program to reduce emissions would need to completely reassess standards. This process could open a tremendous debate within and among republics. In the short term, however, there is the real possibility that pressures to generate income might overshadow environmental legislation. Even if the Russian Republic is willing to maintain natural gas deliveries, relying solely on gas to reduce emissionss is not a comprehensive solution to environmental problems. Continued emphasis on natural gas does not address the issues of NO[sub x] emissions or the emissions of methane (CH4), a strong greenhouse gas, from gas fields and pipeline leaks. The expansion of natural gas supplies themselves are now in question because of environmental questions. New gas fields are being developed in very sensitive areas. Development of the giant gas fields on the Yamal Peninsula (north of the Arctic Circle) have been met with strong opposition from environmentalists and local peoples.
If nothing else, in the short term there should be a "depression" dividend for the environment, at least in terms of sulfur dioxide, as industrial production falls. However, it is extremely important that environmental legislation, regulatory bodies, and emission control devices be put in place by the time industrial activity rebounds.
[1.] Both sulfuric acid and nitric acid are strong acids that are associated with acid deposition. Most of the sulfur contained in fuel leaves smokestacks in a gaseous form as sulfur dioxide, and some of the sulfur dioxide emissions are absorbed directly at the surface of water and land near the point of emissions (dry deposition). Wet deposition is the result of an additional chemical change, when some of the sulfur dioxide is oxidized in the atmosphere to form sulfuric acid (H[sub2]SO[sub4]. Nitrogen is emitted as gaseous oxides (NO[sub x]) from smokestakes and automobile exhaust pipes. As with sulfur dioxide, NO[sub x] can be deposited dry, or oxidized to form an acid (nitric acid, or HNO[sub3]) and be wet deposited. These acids can be deposited on the ground with precipitation or snow. Acid Rain: A Review of the phenomenon in the EEC and Europe, Environmental Resources Limited (New York: Unipub, 1983), p. 55.
[2.] According to Soviet statistics, emissions of sulfur dioxide have dropped dramatically since the early 1980s from a peak of 20.2 million metric tons SO[sub2] in 1983 to 16.8 million metric tons in 1989. In the United States, emissions of sulfur dioxide from stationary sources declined rapidly in the early 1980s although in recent years emissions have increased slightly. While Soviet statistics show a 16% declide in sulfur dioxide emissions between 1980 and 1989, the United States experienced a 8.5% decline in sulfur emissions during the same period.
[3.] Not only is abatement equipment old in the USSR, but in many cases in need of repair, not operated correctly, or shut off at night. According to Soviet data, inoperative emission control equipment is responsible for a significant share of yearly emissions released, although there is insufficient data to determine what kind of abatement equipment, gaseous or particulate, has been at fault. Just as an example, during an inspection of 1773 enterprises (consisting of almost 50,000 emission control units) in 1987, it was found that 23 percent of the units were not operating at design level. As a result of emission control units not running at design conditions-or not working at all--7.1 million tons of pollutants (gaseous and particulate), or 11 % percent of total emissions, were released into the atmosphere. The Ministry of Power and Electrification (Minenergo) accounted for over 50 percent of these excess emissions, followed by the Ministry of Non-ferrous Metallurgy (13 percent). Vestnik Statistiki. 1989. No. 6, pp. 77-78.
[4.] Average annual investment in air pollution abasement curing 1981-198S totaled 130 million rubles. Investment in emission control rose from 234 million rubles in 1985 to 317 million rubles in 1988. only about 80 percent of investment funds allocated for emission control has been spent in recent years, although it is unclear if this is due to insufficient equipment to purchase, or continued slowdowns in construction work.
[5.] Ol" khovskii, G. G. and L. I. Kropp. 1991. Zaschita Okrushaiushchei Sredi pri Proizvodstve Energii v Teplovykh Elektrostantsiakh (Moscow: Energoatomizdat).
[6.] Ibid.
[7.] Obzor Fonovogo Sostianiia Okruzhaiushchei Prirodnoi Sredy v SSSR za 1988 g. 1989. (Moscow: Gidrometeoizdat) p. 14.
[8.] The National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program, Interim Assessment, The Causes and Effects of Acidic Deposition, Volume II (Emissions and Control).
[9.] Izrael', Iu. A., I. M. Nazarov, A. Ia. Pressman, F. Ia. Rovinskii, A. G. Riaboshapko, and L. M. Filippova. 1989. Kislotnye Dozhdi, Second Edition (Moscow: Gidrometeoizdat).
[10.] My analysis draws from data from Iu. A. Izrael', et al.
[11.] Ibid, p. 60.
[12.] Such as in Duginov, V. I., N. I. Malywhko. 1988. "Nabliudenie i Kontrol' za Sostoianiem Atmosfernogo Vozdukha v Evrope i Problemy Predotbrashcheniia Ushcherba ot ego Zagriazneniia" in Akademiia Nauk Ukrainstoi SSR Institute Tekhnicheskai Teplofiziki Problemy Kontroliia i Zashchita Atmosfery ot Zagriiacneniia No. 14.
[13.] Kochurov, B. I. 1989. "Na Puti k Sozdaniiu Ekologicheskoi Karty," Priroda August, pp. 10-17.
[14.] Cooper, R. Caron and Lee Schipper. 1991. "Energy Use and Conservation in the USSR," Energy Policy May;
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By R. Caron Cooper[*], University of California-Berkeley